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preferred. A large number of adjustment seats leads 
in general to a more proportional result. 
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1. Introduction	  
This	   chapter	   provides	   an	   introduction	   to	   the	   essay.	   After	   some	   general	  
background	   information	  and	  presentation	  of	   the	  main	  problems,	  we	  present	  
the	  purpose	  of	  the	  essay	  and	  also	  its	  delimitation.	  	  
 
1.1 Background 
Voting systems are seldom called in questions, but in fact, paradoxes and impossible 
theorem are present in most of them. This is one of major problems with voting 
systems. If for example the number of mandates in the parliament increases and all 
the other factors are held constant; a specific constituency can then lose a mandate in 
the parliament. This seems like contradictory result. How can a constituency get one 
mandate less when the total number of mandates in parliament increases and all the 
other factors are held constant? This is just one example that can occur when a voting 
system is used. This is the so called Alabama paradox and can occur in a quota 
system, which uses a simple rounding technique to determine who gets the last 
remaining votes when the standard quota is fulfilled. A system that suffers from this is 
used in Sweden to determine the number of mandates each constituency should have. 
It has also been used in the United States during the nineteenth century. Through this 
essay, several similar examples of paradoxes will be presented and explained in more 
detail. 
 
Using voting as a procedure for choosing among different alternatives has been done 
for several thousand years. Still there is no system that is sad to be superior to all the 
others; instead many different systems are used. Voting is used in many different 
aspects, for example, voting for candidates, voting for decisions. This essay focuses 
on voting procedure for parliamentary elections and the problem that is present in 
such a procedure, especially the Swedish election system. 
 
How good is then the Swedish election system? After the 2010 election, a lot of 
debate occurred that criticised this system. The election system was created at a time 
when only five parties were present in the parliament and there were no indications 
that this number should increase. After the 2010 election, eight parties are present in 
the parliament, and it has been questioned whether the system is suited for the current 
conditions. Voices have been raised that the system is unfair and that it should be 
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redesign. For example, there are complains that the number of adjustment seats is not 
enough (Sandberg 2010). The Election system has also been criticized for not leading 
to a distribution of mandates, which is sufficiently proportional to the number of 
votes. In the 2010 election the Social Democrat Party received 112 mandates and the 
Moderate Party got 107 mandates. With a fully proportional system1 however, the 
Social Democrats would have received three mandates less and the Moderate Party 
one mandate less. Another conclusion from the last election is that the Alliance 
consisting of four parties (M, FP, KD and C)2 needs two more mandates to receive an 
absolute majority. If a fully proportional were used, they would receive one additional 
mandate (Högström 2010). Consider the idea that the alliance instead would get one 
mandate more than they should have instead of one to few, then they would have 
obtained an absolute majority of mandates. This would have a significant effect on the 
decision making process in the parliament. When the election is very even can just a 
small factor in the election system lead to significant consequences. Since the alliance 
did not get an absolute majority in the last election they are dependent on other parties 
in order to get their propositions through. In particular, this also leads to a pivotal 
position for the right-wing nationalist party, the Swedish Democrats.  
 
The Government have assigned a committee to investigate if the current system 
should be redesigned. The Swedish Minister of Justice minister Beatrice Ask has 
stated that since the last election did not give a proportional result an inspection of the 
system is needed. A decision from the committee is to be expected in December 2012 
(The Ministry of Justice 2011). 
 
1.2 The Problems Considered in this Essay 
The main focus in this essay is on the voting system used in the Swedish parliament, 
which is a proportional system. This means that each party should receive the amount 
of seats in the parliament according to their share of total votes. The share of seats in 
the parliament can however only take integer values. A party cannot receive half a 
seat, but can get 32.76% of total votes for example. The decimals must be rounded in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A party should recieve number of mandates in the parliament similair to their share of total votes.	  2	  M = Moderate Party 
FP= Liberal People´s Party 
KD= Cristian Democratic Party 
C= Centre Party	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some way. How to do this has been a subject for many controversies and different 
system have been used. This is the main discussion of problems that arises in 
proportional election systems. 
 
1.3 Purpose 
The first main purpose of this essay is to give a general overview of the different 
system that is used to distribute mandates in the parliament. It is important to note that 
many different systems can be used and no one is superior to all the others. To have a 
general understanding of the most important system will also help to recognize the 
benefits and disadvantages with the system that is studied. Another intention is to give 
a more detailed view of how the Swedish election system works. This system is 
probably much more technical than many Swedish voters suspect. It serves for that 
reason as a way to become more familiar with the Swedish election system. 
 
The second main purpose is to improve the current election system. This means to 
find a system that decreases the difference between the number of received votes and 
the number of mandates in the parliament. To perform this are the most important 
variables in the Swedish election system varied. These are the number of 
constituencies, the number of adjustment seats and the most important value in the 
technique of distributing mandates. A comparison between the current system and the 
results from the analysis can then be made. This is based on the conditions that are 
present in the 2010 election in Sweden. 
 
1.4 Delimitations 
Of course there are some delimitations, which are necessary to be able to carry out the 
analysis in this essay. Voting systems are used in many different contexts. The focus 
is on voting systems that are used to distribute mandates in the election for the 
parliament. Due to the fact that most countries use different systems, some particular 
system must be chosen. In this essay, the focus is on the Swedish election system. 
Because the data in this essay is based on the distinctive features of the political 
system in Sweden, the results cannot easily been translated to other countries that uses 
a similar election system. There might for example be another number of parties in 
the parliament or another distribution of power, for example with three larger parties 
instead of two. It can however serve as a guide to understand possible effects that may 
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occur if some aspects in the election system are changed. For example, the effect that 
occurs when the number of constituencies decreases, if a uniform improvement can be 
found, this can be used for other countries as well when these systems are analysed. 
 
1.5 Acknowledgement 
A special thanks is expressed to my supervisor Alexander Reffgen, which has 
contributed with a lot of important comments. 
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2. Method	  
This	  chapter	  gives	  firstly	  an	  overview	  over	  the	  structure	  of	  this	  essay.	  Then,	  it	  
explains	   the	   choice	   of	   method	   and	   why	   this	   method	   is	   chosen.	   Lastly	   it	  
presents	  which	  kind	  of	  data	  that	  is	  used	  and	  how	  this	  is	  collected.	  
 
2.1 Overview 
This is an essay in Social Choice Theory, which is a sub discipline in 
Microeconomics. For that reason, a short introduction is presented of what social 
choice is and the most important result in that research area. This is the first part of 
chapter three. The remaining part of chapter 3 discusses voting systems in general. It 
gives an indication of how wide this area is. The reason for presenting this material is 
to give the reader a simple understanding of how the most important voting systems 
work, but also to show that there are many different ways to vote. As just states, this 
chapter is just an overview of some of all possible voting systems; it should therefore 
be read just as an introduction to the subject. The aim is just to give a quick and 
simple understanding of how different kinds of systems work, therefore are many 
examples used. It is not necessary for the remaining part of the essay to understand 
exactly how all the systems work.  
 
Chapter four is the main part of the essay. It firstly presents the proportional voting 
systems, how the calculations in these systems are performed and how it works in 
practice. There are different methods within this system as well. The two most 
important ones are explained in more detail. After this, a detailed presentation of the 
Swedish election system is given. What are the main characteristics of this system, 
and which limitations are used? This is the foundation for how the analysis in the next 
subchapter is performed. There, are all the assumptions that are made in this study 
presented. It also presents exactly how the analysis is performed. This is quite 
technical and requires some understating in statistics. Even if it might be difficult to 
follow exactly how the analysis is performed is the result easier to interpret. The 
meaning of numbers is detailed descripted, which helps the understanding. Chapter 
four finishes with an interpretation and conclusion of the result. It also compares the 
system that is used today with alternative systems that can be used based on our 
analysis. How well does the system in use today actually perform? A summary of the 
essay is then given in a separate chapter. 
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An Appendix contains the data material from the study that is used throughout this 
study. 
 
2.2 Choice of Method 
The main results of this study are based on the outcome of two computer simulations, 
which were carried out using MATLAB, a scientific computation software. Chapter 4 
presents the difference between the simulations and exactly how they are carried out. 
The main features of the election system is the number of constituencies, the numbers 
of adjustment seats and the most important value in the technique of distributing 
mandates. The simulation tries to figure out how well the systems perform when these 
variables are varied. In the simulations, some random variables are used to generate 
possible election result. For each scenario are 2500 simulations made. This creates 
many different outcomes for every combination of variables, out of which the average 
value is calculated. This is then used as the result for how proportional the system is 
when the variables take these particular values. For practical reason must some 
simplifying assumptions be made, the simulation follows still the actual system to 
quite a large extent.  
 
2.3 Sampling and Processing of Data 
The data in this study is based on the result in the 2010 election in the Swedish 
parliament. These numbers are collected from the Swedish election authority. The 
information about how this system works is gathered from the Swedish Constitution. 
Since the simulation is based on many features that are quite sophisticated the way to 
use the data is presented in chapter four. The main purpose of the simulations is to 
evaluate proportionality and for that reasons is a way to measure proportionality 
presented. 
 
2.4 Source of Criticism 
To perform a thorough analysis of the election system where all the aspects of the 
systems are taken into account is not possible given the delimitations with this essay. 
Therefore some assumptions are made which limit the essay. This of course affects 
the result, however, the analysis still take the most important circumstances into 
account and give hence a valuable result. Chapter four finishes with some of the 
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limitations that had to be done to make the simulation possible. It also discusses the 
effects of these and some suggestions for future research are presented.  
 
A comparison between election systems that are used in different countries is not 
possible due to the extent of essay. This is however not the purpose, since this essay 
mainly focus on the proportional election system. The method used to distribute 
mandates between different constituencies is neither taken into account in the 
simulations. Just as in the case for distributing mandates between different parties is a 
method for distributing mandates between the constituencies used. This aspect is 
however not considered. Instead, the size of the constituencies are either assumed to 
be equal or as in the current system. A change in the way to distribute mandates 
would affect the result to some extent. This question has for example been discussed 
in the United States in the last 300 years. As stated before, some delimitation must be 
made. This essay focuses instead on the way to distribute mandates between parties 
when the constituencies follow the distribution stated above. It is though important to 
consider the effect a change in this method has. This becomes clearer when a 
thorough description of the Swedish election system is presented. 
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3. Theory	  
This	  chapter	  provides	  an	  introduction	  to	  voting	  and	  election	  systems.	  Firstly,	  
some	  general	  social	  choice	  theory	  is	  presented,	  and	  then	  we	  present	  the	  two	  
main	  voting	  systems	  and	  discuss	  some	  problems	  related	  to	  them.	  Finally,	  we	  
explain	   and	   compare	   the	   most	   common	   election	   systems	   that	   are	   used	   in	  
practise.	  	  
	  
3.1 Social Choice 
Social Choice Theory is concerned with the question of how to aggregate individual 
preferences into a social preference in a good way in the sense that some reasonable 
normative restrictions are satisfied (Mas-Colell et al, 1995, p. 789). These restrictions 
can of course differ depending on who is asked and which preference to aggregate. 
Why is then the subject social choice needed? In places where market power is the 
dominant factor does not social choice seems to be superfluous? Consider for 
example free trade. Most people prefer this situation since it creates more competition 
and lower prices. However, this might also lead to some people losing their job, for 
example people with worse prerequisites than others. Cannot it be social optimal to 
give these people some subsidy to make them able to keep their business going? How 
can decision like this be made in a rational and transparent way? This is what social 
choice is about (Gaertner 2009, p.1). Free trade might not be social optimal under all 
circumstances, perhaps it can be better for the society in total if those with wore 
prerequisite get a chance to actually compete with established companies.  
 
3.2 Voting Paradoxes 
The pioneer in the area of social choice theory is Kenneth Arrow who in 1963 wrote 
the monograph Social Choice and Individual Values. This is still the foundation of 
social choice theory. Arrow use a function called the Social Welfare function, which 
is as a function that link, each individual preferences to a social preference. This is 
just a rule for how a social preference can be established. This seems not like an 
impossible function to create, however Arrow showed the opposite, instead he 
showed that it is impossible to find a function like this, if some of the attributes of 
such a rule are sad to be fulfilled 
 
Arrow´s Impossibility Theorem says that there any social welfare function that 
satisfies the assumptions of Unrestricted Domain, Pareto Optimality, Independence of 
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Irrelevant Alternatives and No Dictatorship if the there is a finite number of 
individuals and at least three alternatives, exists. To understand what this means are 
the assumptions explained below.  
 
• Unrestricted Domain (UD) – All possible preference profiles are allowed in the 
domain of the social welfare function. This mean that the function must account 
for all individuals preferences. 
• Pareto Optimality (PO) - If all individuals prefer some alternative to another 
alternative, then should also the social preference prefer the former alternative to 
the latter. 
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IEE) - It is only the information between 
the alternatives that are compared that should matter. The ranking between x and 
y should only be based on how the individual rank these alternatives to each other, 
not on how x and y are ranked to another alternative z. 
• Non-Dictatorship (ND) - No individual should have absolute power to determine 
the outcome. This however does not say that all individual should have the same 
voting power (Gaertner 2009, p. 19-21).  
 
Why are exactly these four conditions chosen? Arrow means that these are minimal 
requirements to guarantee a ration social preference, but also to guarantee that the 
members of the societies sovereignty and their possibility to have different values are 
respected (Arrow 1963, p. 31). Each member shall be able to make the decisions on 
his or her own and these shall be accepted by the social choice function, without any 
doubt.  
 
It follows directly from Arrow´s theorem that if UD, PO and IRR are fulfilled than a 
social welfare function must be dictatorial, provided that there exist at least three 
alternatives. A rigorous proof will not be given here, but in case of interest it can be 
found in (Gaertner 2009, p. 21-25). In social choice theory there exist many other 
interesting impossibility theorems and voting paradoxes. Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem is just one, another famous paradox is presented below. These paradoxes 
illustrate the difficulty to generate one final outcome out of many individual different 
preferences.  
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The Condorcet paradox 
This is one of the most cited paradoxes in social choice theory, based on Marquis de 
Condorcet research in the 18th century. It states that the majority rule not always 
leads to a transitive3 ordering of social preferences. The majority rule basically states 
that the alternative with most votes is the winner; this is presented in more detail later 
on. Consider this example, three agents are choosing among three alternatives x, y 
and z using the majority rule. The agents’ preferences are as follows: 
 𝑋! ≻ 𝑌! ≻ 𝑍! 𝑍! ≻ 𝑋! ≻ 𝑌! 𝑌! ≻ 𝑍! ≻ 𝑋! 
 
We can see that agent one and two prefer x to y, so by the majority rule must x 
therefore be socially preferred to y. For the same reason, must y be socially preferred 
to z since agent one and three prefers y to z. If the voting system is transitive then 
must x also be preferred to z, which however is not possible since we can see that 
agent two and three prefer z to x. This cyclic pattern that violates the transitivity 
condition is know as the Condorcet paradox and is a problem in many voting systems 
(Mas-Colell et al 1995, p. 796). 
 
3.3 Voting Systems 
Is there, as a consequence of Arrows Impossible theorem, no hope to find a good 
voting system? Even though Arrow states a negative message to this question, this 
argument depends on some normative conditions stated by Arrow. There exist a large 
literature, which tries to find voting systems that satisfies other normative conditions, 
not just those stated by Arrow. Below we present some voting systems and their 
underlying assumptions. 
 
The majority rule is one of these voting systems and is easy to understand. It says that 
the alternative with most votes is the wining alternative. This majority can then be 
either simple or absolute. When absolute majority is used, the wining alternative must 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Transitivity: If x is preferd to y and y is preferd to z, then must x also be prefered to z, for the relation 
to be transitive (Mas-Collel et al 1995, p.9)	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receive at least half of the votes. With simple majority, the alternative with most votes 
is the winner, even if it gets less than half of the total number of votes. A famous 
theorem called May´s Theorem says that the three conditions: Anonymity, Neutrality 
and Positive Responsiveness4 together with a condition of unrestricted domain are 
necessary as well as sufficient for the simple majority rule to be a social aggregation 
rule (Gaertner 2009, p. 40). A proof of this can be found in (Gaertner 2009, p. 40-43). 
It is also shown that positive responsiveness is not fulfilled in the absolute majority 
rule. The Condorcet paradox shows that the majority rule does not fulfil the criteria of 
transitivity. Is it a problem that the majority rule does not have this property? The 
main problem with a system, where the transitivity conditions is not fulfilled is that no 
best alternative can be stated. The probability for an intratransitive circle when there 
are three voters with three alternatives is 5.55%. This increases as the number of 
people and alternatives increase. Whether it is a problem, depends on the number of 
alternatives and voters (Gaertner 2009, p. 37-43). 
 
Another kind of voting system that can be used is the Borda count. This is a bit more 
sophisticated method. Each voters rank their alternatives according to their 
preferences. These are then transferred into points, where the voters top alternative 
get most points. The alternative with most points in total is the winning alternative. 
Eurovision Song Contest, for example uses a system like this. This system is said to 
fulfil both the neutrality and anonymity condition (Gaertner 2009, p.102-105). An 
example illustrates the possibility to rank alternatives according to the Borda count 
method. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  -­‐Anonymity – All votes are treated equal in the sense that if all the voters in the set change 
preference with each other the outcome should still be the same.  
-Neutrality (NE) - satisfies that all alternatives are treated equally. If all votes are inverted then should 
the outcome as well be inverted. 
 -Positive Responsiveness (PR) –If for example a preference relation is indifference between x and y an 
one person change his preference from y to x then the preference relation should now state that x is 
preferred to y (Gaertner 2009, p. 37-40). This means that if all individuals prefers two alternatives 
equally much, then if one individual change its preference from one of the alternative to the other, then 
the social preference should change in the same way.  	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The interpretation of the example is that voter x gives three point to alternative C, 
voter y does the same, while voter z rank C as their worst outcome. Since C in total 
receives most points, this is the winning alternative. 
 
 If the voter prefers two alternatives over the other ones, however just slightly like one 
of these preferable alternatives more than the other one, this method give him or her 
the possibility to favour both by ranking these as the top alternatives. This is not 
possible in the majority system where each voter just can choose one alternative. If 
the voter, however just likes one alternative he is forced to give points to alternatives 
that is not preferred. Later on the Singe Transferable vote system is presented, which 
is based on the Borda count method.  
 
3.4 Election Systems 
To define different election systems and to explain the differences between them, 
some useful criteria can be used. The size of the constituencies, which defines the 
number of mandates each constituency has, is the first one. The main difference 
between the two major elections systems, the majority- and proportionality voting 
system, is based on this. In the majority voting system, it is most common to choose 
only one candidate in each constituency. This is used for example in the United 
Kingdom where the system is called the “First-Past-The-Post” (FPTP). In 
proportional election systems however, at least two candidates are usually elected. 
The second criterion states how much support a candidate needs to win a mandate in 
each constituency. At least relative majority is needed in a majority voting system, 
whereas in a proportional voting system the mandates are distributed according to the 
number of received votes. The design of the ballot is a third criterion. In some 
countries, it is only possible to mark one candidate on the ballot, whereas in some 
other countries the ballot requires the voter to rank different alternatives. A 
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combination of the majority- and proportionality voting system is called a semi-
proportional voting system, which tries to include the benefits from both systems 
(Choe 2003, p.18-19). These three main categories are presented below. 
 
The majority voting system has two main specializations, either relative- or absolute 
majority. The relative majority system can be divided further into two groups. As 
presented above the FPTP system can be used, where just one candidate is chosen in 
each constituency according to simple majority. This is a straightforward and easy 
understandable system, which also tends to create strong governments. The reason for 
this is because the winner does not have to take into account the opinion of other 
parties. Due to the fact that just simple majority is needed this might lead to a 
distortion of the inhabitants political opinions. If the winning party receives 30% of 
the votes, this mean that 70% of the inhabitants do not share the winning party’s 
political opinion, still this party has mandate to make decisions on their own. Another 
bias is that the party with most votes in the country, not necessarily has to turn out as 
the winning party. If a party receive just one vote to few in a constituency, these votes 
are completely worthless (Choe 2003, p.21-23). 
 
Another form of relative majority is the Block Vote system (BV) in which each voter 
has as many votes as the number of mandates in the constituency. The voters can 
freely choose how to divide the votes, however, it is not possible for a candidate to 
receive more than one vote. Politicians from different parties can be chosen, which 
gives the voters the opportunity to choose exactly the candidates that is supported at 
most. The system basically states that if three mandates are on stake in a single 
constituency, the voter should cast votes on three different candidates (Choe 2003, 
p.21-23).  
 
The absolute majority system can also be divided into two groups. The Two round 
system (TRS) is most common in use in presidential election, for example in France, 
Germany and Russia. The candidate with an absolute majority of votes is the winning 
alternative. If no alternative reach this amount, the two candidates with most votes 
will compete in a new round a couple of weeks later. Since just two candidates are 
left, one of these will get the majority, hence the name “Two round system”. Each 
voter can in this election system support his favourite candidate, since it most 
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probably will be another round later. The risk of tactical voting in the first round 
decreases as well, which is a main argument for using this system. When the first 
round finishes, the parties get the current status of each other strength in the opinion. 
When alliances should be established in the last round this is helpful information. The 
two remaining parties are now competing about the losing parties voters. An 
additional benefit is that it becomes more difficult for extremist parties to get a real 
influence in the parliament. If an extremist party performs well in the first election 
round but not receive an absolute majority, it becomes difficult for them to receive a 
majority in the second election round since most people will then vote for the 
alternative option. The main objective against this system is the cost of arranging it. 
To arrange one election is costly and time consuming for the government and a 
second election doubles this cost. This is especially crucial for countries with 
restricted budget. (Choe 2003, p.23-24).  
 
A second majority voting system is the Alternative Voting system (AV). This gives 
the possibility to include a second and a third alternative if the first candidate is not 
elected. It differ between countries how many alternatives that have to be ranked. In a 
system like this is only one election round used, which decrease the administrational 
costs and transportation problems that are present in the TRS system (Choe 2003 
p.24-26). To start with is only the first name on each ballot calculated. If some 
candidate receives an absolute majority is this the winner. In case no alternative gets 
an absolute majority, the candidate that receives least votes is eliminated. Instead, the 
second name on these ballots is used in a new calculation round. This is repeated until 
there is one candidate that receives an absolute majority (Janson 2012, p. 219). This 
system requires nevertheless more from each voter, who has to gather information 
from other parties than the most preferred one as well. It also requires more from the 
administration of the election, for example to recalculate votes from ballot where the 
top alternative is eliminated. David M Farrel introduced this system since he argued 
that the FPTP-system could possible lead to a negative outcome for parties with 
similar ideology if the voters for this ideology spitted their votes between similar 
parties. If there, for example are two conservative parties and one working class party, 
then even if the two conservative parties together have more votes than the working 
class party, the result can be that the working class party wins the election. The logic 
is that the similar parties “steal” votes from each other (Choe 2003 p.24-26).  
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The basic idea in the proportionality election system is that each party´s share of 
mandates should be equal to their share of votes in total. If a party receives 25% of 
the votes in the election, they should as far as possible also receive 25% of the 
mandates in the Parliament. There are three main factors that have an impact on this. 
The number of constituencies is the first one. If only one constituency exists then 
there is a small difference between the share of votes and the share of mandates in the 
parliament. In the Netherlands and in Israel this is the case for example. If on the 
other hand, many constituencies but only a small number of mandates in each 
constituency exists, then the risk that even large parties not gain any mandates even 
through a substantial amount of votes is received, is much larger. How the distribution 
of mandate is calculates is a second factor. This is discussed in more detail later in the 
chapter. The third main factor, which is also discussed in more detail later on, is the 
use of adjustment seats. These try to compensate for a possible distortion of the 
distribution of mandates, which main occur in a proportional system when many 
constituencies are used. Sometimes an election threshold is used as well, which also 
affects the distribution of mandate. The reason for using a threshold is to keep smaller 
parties outside the parliament because this is said to give a more efficient parliament. 
In Sweden for example, a party must receive at least 4% of the votes in the whole 
country and at least 12% in some constituency to qualify for the parliament (Choe 
2003 p.24-28). This will however not be discussed in much more detail. 
 
As for the majority election system there are different kinds of proportional election 
systems. Three examples are here presented. The first is used in many Scandinavian 
countries and is called the PR-system. Either one or many constituencies are used in 
this system, which is based on some quotas that decides the distribution of mandates. 
One example is the Hare-quota, which is defined as the number accepted votes in 
each constituency divided by the number of mandates in this constituency: 
 𝐻𝑎𝑟𝑒  𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎 =    𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 
 
Each party that has the same or higher quota receives a mandate. If a party get twice 
the quota, one additional mandate is received. The remaining votes are then 
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transferred to the next calculation round, where the parties receives the additional 
mandates according to their number of remaining votes in a decreasing scale. An 
example illustrates this method. Consider the matrix below. 
 
Hare-­‐
Quota	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Party	   First	  round	  
Hare-­‐
Quota	  
Number	  of	  
mandate	  
Second	  
round	  
Number	  of	  
mandate	  
Total	  
mandate	  
SAP	   2100	   1200	   1	   900	   1	   2	  
M	   1900	   1200	   1	   700	   0	   1	  
C	   800	   1200	   0	   800	   1	   1	  
FP	   750	   1200	   0	   750	   1	   1	  
V	   450	   1200	   0	   450	   0	   0	  
 
Only SAP and M reach the Hare-Quota and receives one mandate each in the first 
round. The remaining votes are then used to distribute the remaining mandates in the 
second round. This type of system mostly gains smaller parties, as can be seen in the 
example above where the party FP, which only receive half as many votes as M still 
gets the same number of mandates. Modifying the Hare-quota can increase the 
benefits for the larger parties. The Imperiali quota replaces the denominator by the 
number of mandates plus two, which decreases the quota. This is a gain for the larger 
parties, since more mandates in the first round is received. A quota between the 
Imperiali- and the Hare quota is the non-rounded Droop quota, which instead of 
adding the number two in the denominator just adds the number one (Choe 2003 p.28-
30).  
 
The method is also called the largest remainder method. Instead of using different 
rounds as in the above example, each party’s fair share can be immediately calculated 
according to the formula  
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦  𝑖´𝑠  𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 
 
 SAP´s fair share is for example 1.75. Each party then receives the number of 
mandates according to its lower integer value of its fair share. Then the party with the 
largest remainder receives the additional mandates, hence the name of the method 
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(Demange 2011, p 6-7). The result becomes the same as with the technique used in 
the example.  
 
An alternative way is to use a divisor instead of a quota. There exist several different 
divisor methods. Two of them are the D´Hondt method, which is used in Spain and 
Portugal for example and the modified Sainte-Laguë method, used in Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway for example. D´Hondt method is based on the divisor series 1, 
2, 3, 4… and so on, while the modified Sainte-Laguë series consists of the numbers 
1.4, 3, 5, 7... and so on. The number of votes for each party is divided with a number 
in the divisor series, which gives the parties a value that is compared for each 
mandate. The party with the highest value receives the next mandate. When a party 
wins a mandate the next number in the divisor series is used. An example with the 
D´Hondt method clarifies this. The numbers are the same as in the Hare-quota 
example. 
 
D´Hondt	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  
SAP	   M	   C	   FP	   V	  
Number	  of	  votes	   2100	   1900	   800	   750	   450	  
Frist	  ranking	  (number	  of	  
votes/divisor	  1)	  
2100	  
(1)	  
1900	  
(2)	   800	  (5)	   750	   450	  
Second	  ranking	  (number	  of	  
votes/divisor	  2)	  
1050	  
(3)	  
950	  
(4)	   400	   375	   225	  
Third	  ranking	  (number	  of	  
votes/divisor3)	   700	   633	   267	   250	   150	  
Number	  of	  mandates	   2	   2	   1	   0	   0	  
 
The first mandate is received by SAP since they has the highest value after the first 
ranking. In the second ranking, SAP divides their number of votes with the second 
number in the divisor series. The number 1050 is now used to compare with the other 
parties. Since M has 1900 votes according to their first ranking, they receive the 
second mandate. Party M does then just as SAP did previously and moves over to the 
second ranking. The third mandate is then handled to the party with highest remaining 
number, which in this case is the SAP at 1050. This process proceeds until all 
mandates are distributed. The numbers in the brackets shows which mandate they 
receive, number one stands hence for the first mandate and so on. Note the difference 
	   	   18	  
that occurs between this method and the Hare-Quota method. Party M receives two 
mandates instead of just one and the FP party gets zero mandates. 
 
If the modified Saint-Laguë method is used instead, the numbers at each ranking 
decreases at a higher pace compared to the D´Hondt method, which result in a more 
proportional distribution (Choe 2003 p.30-31). A more thorough analysis of the 
divisor methods is presented in chapter 4. 
 
Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) is a kind of voting system that is a mixture of the 
proportional and the majority voting systems. According to common practice it is 
placed under the category proportional election systems. The system has a part based 
on the proportional election system, for example can 50% of the mandates be 
distributed according to this method and the remaining part through a majority 
election system. The voters participate therefore in two elections. This is used for 
example in Germany and Japan. The argument for using a system like this it to get 
ride of the possible skewness the majority system cause with only one winner, but at 
the same time include the closeness between the inhabitants in the constituencies and 
the elected politicians, which is a major benefit in the majority voting system (Choe 
2003, p.33-34). The most common connection between the systems is based on 
mandates, which is used in Germany for example. This means that the mandates the 
party wins through the majority system are subtracted from the mandates they win in 
the proportional system. This decreases the influence from the largest parties. An 
example illustrates the implementation. First the majority system distributes their 
share of mandates, which for example is 50% of the mandates. The remaining 
mandates are then distributed according to the proportional system, where the 
calculation is based on all mandates in the parliament. Note that the majority system 
is based on just 50% of the mandates in this case. The number of mandates each party 
receives through the proportional method is then decreased with the number of 
mandates gained through the majority system. Just half of the mandates are now 
distributed through the proportional method. In this way the systems interact with 
each other and compensate for the lack of proportionality the majority system suffers 
from but still take advantage of some of the positive effects (Anckar 2002, p. 19). For 
example in Germany, are firstly 299 out of 598 mandates distributed through the 
FPTP system. The proportional system distributes then 598 seats according to the 
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Sainte-Laguë method. The numbers of mandates gained through the FPTP system is 
then removed from this distribution so just 299 mandates remains. If a party receives 
more mandates through the FPTP system than is justified by the proportional system, 
these will be overhang seats. Different methods can then be used to solve the 
problems with the overhang seats. One example is that the party keeps their number 
of mandates and the total numbers of mandates in the parliament increases (Janson 
2012, p. 271). 
 
Single Transferable Vote (STV) is a kind of preference voting system where the 
voters rank their alternatives according to who they prefer at most, as is the Borda 
count method. Compared to most other proportional voting systems, the voter chooses 
among candidates rather than parties. It is possible to vote on politicians in the same 
party, but also to choose candidates from different parties if this is preferred. To 
ensure that the election is performed correctly it is important that sufficient 
information is available about all the candidates. At the same time put this 
responsibility on each voter to spend the time necessary to get an opinion about all 
candidates they are ranking. The design of the ballot is an important issue. It is 
possible that candidates at the top of the ballot receives many votes from people who 
do not know where to put their alternative votes and just select the first one in the list. 
The number of alternatives the voters must put on the ballot differs between countries. 
Five mandates are recommended to ensure it not becomes too difficult for the voters. 
When the mandates are distributed among the alternatives, a formula, which is similar 
to the Hare-quota, is used. It is called the Droop-quota and is defined as 
 𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑝  𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  𝑖𝑛  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦  𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 + 1 + 1   
 
If a candidate reaches this quota then a mandate is received. The remaining votes for 
this candidate are then transferred to the next round where the second alternative on 
these ballots receives the remaining votes. This can however be performed quite 
arbitrary since it is just the redundant votes that should be calculated. Different 
methods are used to solve this problem. For example can there be some 
predetermined method, which selects the votes to calculate, or can all votes be 
transferred however to a lower value than the original vote. If the Droop Quota for 
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example is 15 000 and a candidate receives 20 000 votes, then are 5000 redundant 
votes. Which 5000 out of these 20 000 ballots that should be transferred to the second 
alternative is then the problem. If no candidates reach the quota then the candidate 
with least votes is eliminated and the second alternative on these ballots receives their 
votes. These procedures are then repeated until all mandates are distributed (Janson 
2012 p.151-156). 
 
The third main category is the semi-proportional election systems, which as 
mentioned before is a mixture between the proportional and majority systems. Just as 
the MMP system does, it tries to combines the benefits from both kinds of systems 
but they do not interact with each other to the same extent as in the MMP system. 
There are two semi-proportional systems, which are the most common ones. The first 
is the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV), where the voter can choose only one 
alternative, even if there are several mandates on stake. The candidates with most 
votes get the place in the parliament, even if he or she only receives 20 % of the 
votes. The vote is for a person, and a list is hence not used. This also puts pressure on 
the intern relationship in each party since the candidates are competing for the same 
voters. Smaller parties with a fragmented election support might be without mandates, 
since enough votes in a single district even if they in total get a substantial amount of 
votes cannot be gained. The main difference compared to the majority system is that 
more than one mandate are on stake in each constituency. The main difference to the 
proportional system is quite obvious since mandates are not distributed by share of 
votes but rather by majority (Anckar 2002, p.24). Consider the example where three 
parties exist: A, B and C. The constituency inhabits 10000 people and three mandates 
are on stake. Party A would like to receive two mandates but B and C are pleased if 
they only receive one mandate. A will therefore participate with two candidates, X 
and Y, while Party B and C only participates with one candidate each, Z and Q. The 
votes are as follows: 
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Party A is obviously the most popular party and receives 60% of the votes, however it 
receives only 33% of the mandates. The party must hence in advance evaluate how 
many candidates they should have and which persons that should represent them. If 
party A choose two more equally popular persons, they can get 3000 votes each and 
hence receive two mandates. A popular candidate can “steal” votes from a party 
comrade. 
 
The second semi-proportional system is the Parallel System (PS). A close relation 
between this and the MMP system exists. The PS system does not have the 
mechanism from the MMP system that decreases the disproportionality caused by the 
majority election system. This is the reason for PS being called semi-proportional and 
MMP take place under the proportional election systems. The PS system does not 
decrease the number of mandates distributed through the proportional system with the 
number of mandates the party receives through the majority system. The two systems 
do not interact with each other as they do in the MMP system. The proportional part 
of the Parallel System is just based on their share of total mandates, while it is based 
on all mandates in the MMP system, which then is decreased with the number of 
mandates gained through the majority system. The MMP system tends therefore to 
give a more proportional distribution than the PS system (Choe 2003 p.38-41). 
 
Below shows a diagram how the systems are connected to each other. 
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Figure 3.4.1 	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4. Analysis	  
This	   chapter	   starts	   with	   a	   more	   thorough	   description	   of	   the	   proportional	  
election	  system	  than	  in	  the	  preceding	  chapter,	  and	  in	  particular,	   it	  explains	  
the	   details	   of	   the	   Swedish	   election	   system.	   Then	   it	   presents	   a	   method	   to	  
analyse	  the	  proportionality	  of	  the	  Swedish	  election	  system	  and	  how	  the	  main	  
parameters	  of	  this	  system,	  namely	  the	  number	  of	  constituencies,	  adjustment	  
seats	  and	  the	  value	  of	  the	  first	  divisor,	  should	  be	  chosen.	  	  
	  
4.1 The Proportional Election Systems 
As stated in the preceding chapter, Sweden uses a proportional voting system. The 
distribution of mandates was there presented in a general way. Either a quota or a 
divisor method can be used. The number of mandates in the examples was 
exogenously given, but when constructing a voting system the question concerning 
the number of mandates each constituency should get is crucial. Should it be equally 
distributed? In the European Union for example, Germany has 99 mandates while 
Malta has six. Germany´s population is however about 200 times larger then Malta´s. 
This gives Germany a population-to-seat ration of 1 mandate for each 826.285 
inhabitants, while in the case of Malta it is 1 mandate per each 68.828 citizen 
(Demange 2011, p. 2). What is the consequence of this? If the purpose of the election 
system is to be as proportional as possible, then to give each constituency the same 
population-to-seat ratio is intuitively to prefer, which leads to more mandates for 
Germany, but also a significant amount of influence. Malta on the other hand 
becomes a minor actor in the parliament and loses their chance to affect the decisions.  
 
The problem with constructing an assembly with different parties, and many minor 
constituencies is called the bi-apportionment problem. This is due to the geographical 
and the political aspect (Demange 2011, p 1). How the distribution of mandates 
between different constituencies should be made so the elections system becomes as 
proportional as possible has a long history and has been debated by many different 
professions such as mathematicians, statisticians and political analysts. In the United 
States for example, has this issue been debated for almost two hundred years (Young 
2004, p. 3). This essay focuses however not on this important issue, but instead we 
focus on the question how to distribute mandates between parties based on their share 
of votes. The number of mandates for each constituency is taken as given.  
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If the purpose is to receive a result that is as proportional as possible, how should the 
election system be designed? This essay focuses on the Swedish election system, 
where PR-list system is used. The Swedish Election Authorities states “The Swedish 
electoral system should as fair as possible, reflect the people's political will. Therefore 
shall mandates (seats) in such parliament or council be distributed in relation to the 
number of votes that the parties receive in the election. If a party, for example, 
receives twenty per cent of the votes then they should also get about twenty per cent 
of the mandates. Such a voting system is called proportional.” (www.val.se A). The 
Hare quota, which also is known as the largest remainder method is in theory said to 
give the most proportional system. Is it not obvious to use this method then? Three 
famous paradoxes illustrate some substantial problem that can occur with this method. 
 
The Alabama paradox shows that when the number of mandates in the assembly 
increases, while the other variables are constant, some constituencies may receive 
fewer mandates than before the increase. This was first discovered in Alabama during 
the nineteenth century. It shows that the state of Alabama receives eight mandates in 
the House of Representation when the number of mandates is 299, but when this 
number increases to 300, does Alabama only receive seven mandates. How can this 
contradictory result occur? The reason is because the largest remainder method is 
used. When the number of mandates changes, this affects the denominator in the 
quota for each constituency. This leads in some cases to another outcome. Consider 
the example, where the number of mandates in the assembly changes from 21 to 22 
mandates. 
 
 
Figure 4.1.1 
 
The example shows that B loses one mandate when the number of mandates in total 
increases (Young 2004, p 12). 
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A second paradox, called the population paradox defines the case when a constituency 
with larger population growth loses a mandate in the assembly to another 
constituency with lower growth rate. Consider a large constituency with lower growth 
rate than the national average and a smaller constituency with no growth rate at all. 
As time goes becomes the decrease in quota for the large constituency more 
substantial than for the smaller, even if it has a higher growth rate. Consider a small 
constituency A with the quota 1.541 in the year 1990 and a large constituency B with 
the quota 27.576 the same year. If a new calculation is done the next year, it is 
possible that A get the quota1.519 and B 27.350. The quota for both constituencies 
are now smaller because they grow less than the national average, constituency A 
however, receives the extra mandate according to the largest remainder system. This 
occurs because the quota for the larger constituency is affected more than for the 
smaller constituency when they grow below national average even if it has a higher 
growth rate (Young 2004, p 21-22). 
 
The third paradox called the Oklahoma paradox or the New-State paradox describes 
the situation when a new constituency is added and the number of mandates in the 
assembly increases in relation with the new constituency´s population. When a new 
distribution of mandates is implemented because of this, a change in the number of 
mandates for some constituencies can occur, even though if the population in these 
constituencies is unchanged (Demange 2011, p. 7). An example illustrates, where a 
third constituency C and a fair amount of five mandates are added to the assembly. 
 
Oklahoma	  Paradox	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
Population	   Quota	   Mandates	  
	   	  
A	   1045	   10,45	   10	  
Number	  of	  
Mandates	   100	  
B	   8955	   89,55	   90	  
	   	  Total	   10000	   100	   100	  
	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
A	   1045	   10,43	   11	  
Number	  of	  
Mandates	   105	  
B	   8955	   89,34	   89	  
	   	  C	   525	   5,24	   5	  
	   	  Total	   10525	   105	   105	  
	   	  Figure 4.1.2 
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C loses a mandate to constituency A even though the population is constant and a fair 
amount of five additional mandates are added. These paradoxes are presently as well 
when mandates between parties are distributed, rather than between constituencies as 
in in the examples above. 
 
These paradoxes highlight some problems with the quota method, which are not 
desirable in a “good” election system. The main cause for these problems is because 
the remainders are adjusted differently depending on the size of the constituencies or 
parties, when changes occur, which are most significant in the population paradox. 
The divisor methods however, do not suffer from these problems, and the paradoxes 
just presented cannot occur in these methods (Demange 2011, p.7). This is one reason 
why they are more commonly in use than the Hare-quota (Choe 2003, p. 30)and 
(Anckar 2002, p.16). Previously have the two most commonly in use divisor methods, 
namely the D´Hondt and Sainte-Laguë method, been introduced. There exist other 
divisor methods as well. A few of them are mentioned later on.  
 
The D´Hondt divisor is also known as the Jefferson method, actually Jefferson 
presented this more than 100 years before D´Hondt. Since quota methods contain 
some seriously problems, as shown above, a method that can create a proportional 
election result without these paradoxes occurring is preferred (Demange 2011, p.6-7). 
The mathematics behind the divisor models can be shown both by a multiplier and a 
divisor, and both methods results in the same outcome. The multiplier method is 
explained only briefly. In the following, denote by s1 the number of mandates for 
party i. 
 
Firstly is standard quota q! = !! ∗ v!5, where S is the total amount of mandates, 
calculated, then multiply each qi with a number α ≥1, which is chosen so Σ   𝛼𝑞! = 𝑆 
holds. Each party, pi, receives (αqi) mandates. When the value of α increases to satisfy 
the equation above, the value of αqi tends to increase faster for larger then for minor 
parties. Large parties reach a new integer value and therefore a new mandate faster 
than minor ones. This is the reason why the method tends to favour larger parties and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 v = number of votes 
s= number of mandates 
p= party	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coalitions. A short example illustrates this. Consider for example the two quotas: 
q1=4.5 and q2=5.5. For q1 to reach the next integer it must be multiplied with 
approximately 1.11, while q2 only needs to be multiplied with approximately 1.091. 
The larger quota reaches the next integer faster. The reason why the Alabama paradox 
not occurs in this method is because the lower quota condition is satisfied, which 
means that a party receives at least as many mandates as its lower quota, qi. There is 
however, a possibility that a party gets more mandates than its upper quota, which 
corresponds to the upper integer of the standard quota. A party with a standard quota 
of five, can still receive seven mandates, the upper quota of six is then passed (Lanke 
2012, p.3). 
 
It is more usual and intuitive to describe this method with a divisor, rather than with a 
multiplier. The term !!!  is used instead of (αqi). Lambda indicates an unknown positive 
variable. Just as before must Σ   !!! = 𝑆(𝜆) hold. Each party receives numbers of 
mandates according to 𝑠! =    !!! . To explain the approach of this method, assume that 
v1>v2>,,,>vn holds. The first mandate is distributed when λ=v1, p1, receives then a 
mandate. The winner of the next mandate depends on the relationship between the 
numbers of votes for the two largest parties. Either when !!! = 2  𝑜𝑟   !!! = 1, whichever 
happens first. Either party one wins its second mandate or the second largest party 
receives its first. The fractions can be rewritten to: 
 λ! =    v!1+ 1   and  λ! = v!0+ 1 
 
The value of λ determines which party gets the next mandates. If the mandates are 
distributed among the parties according to s1, s2, …,sp but these sum to less than S, 
who gets the next seat? A method for distributing the mandates is obtained by 
manipulating the lambdas. When !!!  changes from si to (si + 1) the party pi receives an 
additional mandate, this happens when 𝜆 =    !!!!!!. This is called the comparative 
figures. The rule for this method is to deliver the next mandate to the party with 
largest comparative figure, λi, and then to recalculate the party´s, λi, after each 
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received mandate. The D´Hondt series with divisors 1,2,3,..,n, is now obtained (Lanke 
2012, p 3-4).  
 
This method is based on a way of rounding downwards. There are other ways to 
round as well. The Sainte-Laguë uses the standard-rounding principle, which is 
explained in the following. 
 
The Sainte-Laguë method is also known as Webster method. As in the previous case 
was Webster about hundred years before Sainte-Laguë. In fact Webster and Jefferson 
competed against each other concerning which method to use for distributing 
mandates between states in the United States congress election (Young 2004, p.4-8). 
This method follow the same logic as D´Hondts method, however, it adds a half in the 
denominator for each comparative figure when a mandate is won, instead of the 
number one as in D´Hondts method. The comparative figures for the Sainte-Laguë 
method is presented in this figure: λ! = v!(s! + 12) 
 
The next mandate is thus given to the party with the largest value of λi. If all of the 
divisors !! , !! , !! , etc are multiplied with two, which does not affect the result, we 
obtain the following series of divisors 1,3,5, etc. Compared to D´Hondt method, 
Sainte-Laguë does not tend to favour larger parties as much because the divisors are 
increasing faster, which means that more votes are required to get the same number of 
mandates. To receive the second mandate according to D´Hondt method, the number 
of votes is divided with two, while in Sainte-Laguë method it is divided with three, 
which gives a smaller number to compare with other parties (Lanke 2012, p3-5).  
 
An example illustrates how proportionality can be obtained within this method. 
 
Suppose that three parties, with their numbers of votes in the brackets, A (333), B 
(237) and C (130), exist. For pedagogical reasons, we compare A and B. The 
advantage with the Sainte-Laguë method is otherwise that a pairwise comparison of 
parties is not necessary; instead the comparative figures can be used. Assume that 
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there are seven mandates on stake in total, and that it is given that C receives one 
mandate for its share of votes. Party A and B shall divide the remaining mandates 
between them in a proportional way. Each mandate is worth 95 votes (!!!!!"#! = 95). 
The diagram below operates a function for who is worth the additional mandate. 
 
 
 
A deserves a little more than 3.5 mandate while B deserves just below 2.5. The most 
proportional is, for A to receive four mandates and for B to get two mandates. Is there 
any way to motivate this? Note that 333 >    !!!!!"#! ∗ 3.5 and 237 < !!!!!"#! ∗ 2.5, 
which is equivalent to !!!! > !"#!  (Linusson 2008, p 172). This is similar to the Sainte-
Laguë formula, A divides their number of votes with the forth divisor, which is seven, 
and party B compares their number of votes with the third divisor. Because the 
comparative figure for A is larger then for B, they receive their fourth mandate, while 
B remains at two mandates. 
 
In chapter three it is however a modified Sainte-Laguë method that is introduced. 
Instead of 1 as the first divisor, the value 1.4 is used. Why is this modification done? 
Obviously it has a negative effect for smaller parties since it requires more votes to 
get the first mandate. It keeps smaller parties out of the parliament. A similar effect as 
using a threshold is achieved. The reason for using a threshold is to create a stronger 
parliament, with more influence in the decision-making. If many minor parties exist, a 
situation where the larger parties are forced to negotiate with these to get the support 
they need, may occur. This makes the parliament and the decision-making more 
sluggish. To use a threshold in the proportional elections system, will include one of 
the advantages that are apparent in the majority election system, which creates 
stronger government (Anckar 2002, p.25). 
 
Is it obvious to use the number 1.4 instead of 1? What if the number 1.2 is used? This 
question is analysed with the help of some simulations later on. 
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There exist other methods as well, which use different kinds of divisors, such as 
Huntington-Hills method. This is not presented in detail. It can though be mentioned 
that it has played a central role in the debate in the United States (Young 2004, p11, 
16).  Huntington-Hills divisor is used in the United States since 1930 for distributing 
mandates between constituencies. It use the divisor n ∗ (n+ 1), which tends to 
favour smaller parties to a larger extent than D´Hondt and Sainte-Laguë methods 
(Demange 2001, p.8). The diagram below shows the most important systems and the 
formulas. 
 
Methods	   Divisors	   Formula	  
D'Hondt	  (Jefferson)	   1,	  2,	  3,	  4,	  5…	   	  n+1	  
Sainte-­‐Laguë	  
(Webster)	  
!! , !! , !! , !!,…	   𝑛 + 12	  
	  
1,	  3,	  5,	  7,…	   2n+1	  
Modified	  Saint-­‐Laguë	   1.4,	  3,	  5,	  7	  
	  
Huntington-­‐Hill	  
”0”,	  √2,	  √6,	  √12,	  
√20	   𝑛 + (𝑛 + 1)	  
Figure 4.1.3 (Linusson 2011, p. 36) 
 
4.2 The Swedish Election System 
As stated before, the Swedish election system shall be as proportional as possible. 
Several techniques to fulfil this are used. All the main steps are explained in this 
chapter. The first question concerns the number of mandates for each constituency. 
The Swedish parliament consists of 349 mandates, where 310 are so-called pre 
determined mandates that are distributed to the constituencies before the election. The 
remaining 39 mandates are so-called adjustment seats. These are distributed 
afterwards to compensate for the lack of proportionality, which may occur when the 
310 mandates are distributed (www.val.se, B). The country is divided into twenty-
nine constituencies. See Appendix A, for a list of these (Election law, chapter 4, §2). 
To determine the number of mandates for each constituency, the Hare-Quota is used. 
Each constituency receive a number of number mandates according to the formula: 
 Number  of  people  in  the  consistuency  area(Number  of  people  in  the  whole  country310 ) = number  of  mandates 
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Remember that the Hare-Quota states that if the number is not an integer, the quota is 
rounded downwards, and the largest remainder determines which constituency 
receives the additional mandates. The number 310 is used since there are 310 
mandates determined in advance. If the remainder is equal in two constituencies, a 
lottery shall determine which constituency gets the additional mandate. The 30th of 
April the same year as the elections, determines the election authority the distribution 
of mandates between constituencies (Election law, chapter 4, §3). 
 
After the voting process, the votes are counted and the distribution of mandates takes 
place. The number of votes each party received for all constituencies in the 2010 
election is presented in appendix B. The example in this chapter is based on these 
numbers. First the 310 mandates are distributed to the constituencies. The example 
below shows the distribution of mandates in the constituency of Malmoe. The value 
in each cell corresponds to the value calculated by the modified Sainte-Laguë method. 
Party M receive 55160 numbers of votes in this constituency, which give them the 
value on the comparative figure !!"#$!.! = 39400 in the first round. Since this is the 
highest value, M gets the first mandate, which is marked with a red cell. When a party 
wins a mandate, it uses the next divisor in the next round. The comparative figure for 
party M is therefore !!"#$! = 18386.67 in the second round. This number is lower 
than the comparative figure for party S, which receive the second mandate for that 
reason (Election law, Chapter 14, §3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2.1 
 
To determine the distribution of the 310 pre-determined mandates, this process is 
performed in each constituency. Then, the distribution of adjustment seats takes place. 
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For pedagogical reasons is this called the “total distribution”. This procedure is 
similar to the example above, but there is only one constituency, which is the whole 
country and the number of mandates is 349. To make the result as proportional as 
possible, each party should receive the number of adjustment seats so that the party´s 
share of mandates in the parliament equals the party´s share of votes in total (Election 
law, chapter 14, §4). To make this possible, the party then receives the additional 
number of adjustments seats, which is needed for the party to receive the number of 
mandates according to the total distribution. The party, which receive to few of the 
310 mandates from the total distribution, is therefore entitled to receive some 
adjustment seats. If a party instead gets more of the 310 pre-determined mandates 
than they are entitled to regarding the total distribution, they still keeps its number of 
mandates. Instead a new total distribution of adjustment seats is obtained where these 
parties’ mandates are removed. The same method is implemented if a party does not 
reach the threshold of 4% (Election law, chapter 14, §5). An example illustrates the 
method. In the 2010 election the parties received mandates according to the diagram 
below.  	  
 
Figure 4.2.2 
 
The diagram shows that the parties M and S received more mandates according to the 
first distribution then they are obligated to according to the total distribution. They 
receive therefore zero adjustment seats. As the (Election law chapter 14, §5) states, 
these parties still keep their amount of mandates and a new total distribution is 
calculated where these parties are eliminated. When M and S are removed there are 
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130 mandates6 left which shall be distributed to the remaining parties with the same 
method as before. Then the following result is obtained. 
 
 
Figure 4.2.3 
 
The diagram shows the distribution of the 39 adjustment seats between the remaining 
parties. The adjustment seats are received in the constituency where the party has its 
highest remainder after the first 310 mandates are distributed. If a party has not 
received a mandate in a constituency, its remainder is equal to the number of votes 
they received in this constituency. For example gets the party C its adjustments seats 
in the constituency of Gothenburg and Södermanland, where the remainder are 12183, 
which is the same as the number of votes they received in this constituency.  
 
4.3 Simulations 
The main purpose with this essay is to examine how well the Swedish election system 
performs with respect to proportionality, and to analyse which changes that can be 
implemented to receive a system that gives a more proportional result. To analyse 
these questions are two simulations performed, which are presented below. To begin 
with, we present a short overview of over previous research in this field. It can be 
noted that none of these studies has the exact same framing as our study, at least to or 
knowledge.  
 
Lars Davidsson examines the 2006 election in Sweden. He shows the difference in 
proportionality that may occur if some other election methods are used. The result is 
that if the first divisor takes the value 1 instead of 1.4, there is no difference. Another 
implication is that D´Hondts method gives a less proportional result than the Sainte-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  349(Tot) -107(M) – 112 (S) = 130	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Laguë, and that the Hare-Quota gives a more proportional result. This result tends 
hence to follow the theory in this area (Davidsson 2007, p. 31). 
 
Jan Lanke investigates how a more proportional result can be achieved, by changing 
the election system. The problem, according to him, is that a party can receive more 
of the 310 pre-determined seats than they are obligated to according to the total 
distribution. Two factors are varied in this study, the number of adjustment seats and 
the value of the first divisor in the Sainte-Laguë divisor method. He shows the least 
amount of adjustment seats that are needed to give a result that can be called 
proportional. The research is performed for the period 1970-2010, and the first divisor 
takes values between 1-1.5 with a step size of 0.05. The result shows that the divisor 
1.15 and 1.2 give the lowest value of maximum adjustment seats that is needed to 
ensure that no party receives more pre-determined seats than they are obligated to. 
This can imply that these systems give more proportional result (Lanke 2012, p.8). 
 
Young shows the important result, that the Alabama, Population and Oklahoma 
paradoxes that can occur in the quota methods are not present in the divisor methods. 
This is a fundamental result and is one of main argument to use a divisor method 
instead of a quota method (Young 2004, p.22).  
 
Below is the result of the 2010 Swedish parliament election shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.1, source: www.val.se, C 
	   	   35	  
Note that the percentage of votes is just based on the total number of votes for the 
parties that actually receive mandates. The reason is because these are the only parties 
that can receive mandates according to the threshold. The factor, others affects for 
that reason not the distribution of mandates and shall therefore not affect the share of 
votes when a comparison between these results are made. It becomes for that reason 
the relevant result to use, when a comparison with the simulations is done later on. 
This is why the percentage of votes sum to 101.45.  
 
Is this result proportional? The social democrats gets 1% unit more mandates 
compared with its share of votes, which gives them 3.5 mandates to many. For most 
of the other parties there is just a small difference. It can be argued that since the 
largest difference for a party is just 1% unit, this system gives a proportional result, 
but when the election is very even, this small difference have a significant effect on 
the political decision-making. In the last election, three blocks received mandates: the 
Alliance (the right wing block), including M, FP, KD and C, the left wing block 
consisting of V, MP and S and a third block with the SD party. The Alliance won the 
last election even though they received only 49.57 % of the mandates, and hence not 
an absolute majority. If M instead of S would have received three mandates more than 
they were worth according to their number of votes, the Alliance had got 50.43% of 
the seats, which had given them an absolute majority in the parliament. This may 
seem like a naive comparison, it indicates though that just a small difference can 
determine whether a block gets an absolute majority in the parliament or not. The 
purpose with the proportional election system should then be to have as small 
difference as possible between the share of votes and the share of received seats in the 
parliament.  
 
Is there any way to measure the proportionality of an election system and can any 
change in the current system be made that leads to a more proportional result? I have 
together with my supervisor, Alexander carried out two different simulations. These 
simulations examine what happens with the proportionality of the election system 
when some variable in the construction are changed. In following we describe first in 
detail the construction of the simulations, then is the result presented and interpreted. 
 
 
	   	   36	  
4.3.1 Assumptions and Construction of the Simulations 
The first simulation studies how the proportionality in the election result depends on 
the variables, adjustment seats and constituencies, while the second simulation 
examines the effect that, the numbers of adjustment seats and the value of the first 
divisor in the Sainte-Laguë method, have on proportionality. The main difference 
between the simulations is that simulation two uses the present classification of 
constituencies, while all constituencies in the first simulation are of equal size. The 
common assumptions for both simulations are presented below.  
 
• pi denotes party i, and eight parties are presently in total which all get at least 4% 
in each simulated election. It is also assumed that no other parties exist. 
• These parties are divided into the same blocks as mentioned above 
The left wing block (L): 
1: Left Party (V) 
2: Social Democratic Party (S) 
3: Green Party (MP) 
 
The Alliance or the right wing block (R): 
4: Liberal Peoples Party (FP) 
5: Centre Party (C) 
6: Christian Democratic Party (KD) 
7: Moderate Party (M) 
 
Others: 
8: Swedish Democratic Party (SD) 
 
• This distribution between the blocks is used later in the simulation to calculate the 
number of votes for each party 
• The measure for proportionality is: 
 
%  mandate  for  p! −%  votes  for  p!!!!!"#$%  !  
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The absolute percentage difference between number of mandate and number of votes 
is summed for all parties, which gives a proportionality value of the election system. 
This measure is invented for this essay, to make it possible to perform the analysis. It 
is worth mentioning that a negative outcome is impossible, and a value of zero 
corresponds to a perfect proportional result. As the value increases, a worse 
representation of proportionality is achieved. 
• The number of adjustment seats varies between 30 and 59 
• The outcome of the 2010 election is used to determine the expected value and 
standard deviation, which the simulations are based on. This is explained in more 
detail later on. 
• For each combination of variables (number of constituencies, adjustment seats and 
value of the first divisor) that is considered, are 2500 election outcomes simulated. 
It is a statistical reason to use 2500 simulations for each combination, which is 
based on the fact that an accuracy of 0.1 is used. If an accuracy level of 0.01 is 
used instead, an amount of 2500007 observations are needed, which requires about 
2 years of time for a computer to calculate.   
• The election turnout is 80% on national level. This number varies though between 
the constituencies according to a normal distribution with a standard deviation of 
0.03. Each fifth constituency acts as a stabilizer so the number 80% is reached. If 
the first four constituencies have turnouts of 0.78, 0.80, 0.81, 0.82, then the fifth 
constituency must have a turnout of 0.79, which result in an election turnout of 
80% in total. This procedure is then repeated for all constituencies. 
 
4.3.2 Simulation 1 
The first simulation examines the impact the variables, adjustment seats and number 
of constituencies, have on the proportionality of the election result. Some additional 
assumptions are made: 
• 7 017 479 peoples are entitled to vote in the election 
• The number of constituencies takes the values 10, 15, 20, 21, …, 29, 30. 
• The constituencies are of equal size. For example, if 20 constituencies are 
assumed, !"#!$!%!" = 350  874 people are entitled to vote in each constituency. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  To estimate an expected value with, n, numbers of observations with a standard error, α, the function: !! = α is used. Note that σ is maximum of about 5 according to the tables in Appendix C	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4.3.3 Execution of the Simulations 
To begin with, the election result is calculated on the on national level according to 
the procedure presented below (note that the numbers indicate per cent of votes in 
total). 
• Firstly receives the smallest block their share of votes, which is SD. This value 
has a normal distribution with expected value, µ equal to 5% and a standard 
deviation, σ of 0.75. This can also be denoted as 𝑃!~𝑁(5, 0.75). An interval 
between 4-7 %8, limit the number of votes SD can get. This means that SD cannot 
receive less than 4% of the votes and be eliminated from the election according to 
the threshold; neither can they receive more than 7%. If no upper limit is assumed 
in this analyse, a chance that a party receive unreasonable large amount of votes 
may occur. SD could in a situation like that receive 100% of the votes.  
• The remaining amount of votes is then distributed between the two major blocks. 
 
A random number for the difference in per cent between the two other blocks is 
drawn. This random number denotes the difference in per cent of votes between the 
left and the right wing blocks and has a normal distribution with an expected value of 
0 and a standard deviation of 2, in other words (L− R)  ~N(0, 2). This indicates the 
same opportunity to win for both blocks. According to this and the number of 
received votes for the SD party, a result for the remaining blocks can be calculated. 
Consider the outcome where SD receive 5.5% of votes, and the difference between 
the left and right wing blocks are 3 per cent, in favour for the right wing block. This 
results in 45.75% of the votes for the left wing block, and 48.75% of the votes for the 
right wing block.9  
• Within the left block, the votes are then distributed as follows.  P!~N(5, 0.5), [4,8] P!~N(10,2), [4,14]  
The Social democrats receives the remaining number of votes in the left block, P! = L− P! − P!. 
• For the right wing block are the votes distributed according to the same principle 
as above: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Can also be denoted [4,7]	  9	  L+R= 94,5 and L-R= -3 <-> L+3=R  
-> L+L+3=94,5 -> 2L=91,5 -> L=91,5/2 -> L=45,75	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P!~N(5, 1.5), [4,12] P!~N(6, 1), [4-9] P!~N(5, 0.5), [4-7] 
As in the case for the left wing block, M which is the largest party gets the remaining 
votes: P! = R− P! − P! − P!.  
 
This shows the national distribution of votes. The votes are then distributed among 
the constituencies, which must be treated independently. In each constituency, each 
party gets a share of total votes according to the number calculated on national level 
(from the above section) with a random disturbance. To be precise, the party´s share 
of votes is multiplied with a random number from the uniform distribution on the 
interval from 0.9 to 1.1. If a party for example receives 5% nationally they can get a 
number of votes between 4.5-5.5 in a constituency, which are adjusted for every third 
constituency. When two constituencies are calculated, the third gets a number so these 
three constituencies get the same number as on national level. For example, if P4 get 
5% of votes nationally, and 4.5% respectively 5% in the first two constituencies, then 
it must in the third constituency receive 5.5% of the votes. This is analogous to the 
procedure for the election turnout of 80% in the assumptions. 
 
According to the assumptions above, we implement a MATLAB-script that simulates 
2500 election outcomes. Then we use another implemented MATLAB-script to 
distribute mandates in the same way that is used in Sweden and described in chapter 
4.2. These values are then compared to each other according to the measure for 
proportionality in the assumptions. This indicates how proportional the election is. 
The procedure is repeated 2500 times, which gives 2500 numbers of proportionality, 
one for each simulated election. Finally, an average value of these 2500 numbers is 
calculated. This average number (the numbers in each cell in the appendix C 
matrices) shows how proportional the election system is based on the values the 
variables, adjustment seats and number of constituencies, takes. It is repeated for 
every combination of variables. The results are then placed in a matrix with 
adjustment seats on the vertical axis and the number of constituencies on the 
horizontal axis. An identical method is used to calculate the standard deviation, which 
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is placed in another matrix below (these matrices are presented in Appendix C). This 
is performed for five different divisor methods: 
 
• D´Hondt method (1,2,3,4,5…) 
• Sainte-Laguë method (1,3,5,7…) 
• Modified Sainte-Laguë method with 1.2 as the first divisor 
• Modified Sainte-Laguë method with 1.4 as the first divisor (the system used in 
Sweden) 
• Modified Sainte-Laguë method with 1.6 as the first divisor 
 
It is worth mentioning that the intervals in the simulations are not exact. The reason is 
because it does not exist enough of reliable data to estimate reasonable values for the 
range within the parties can receive votes. Since it passes four years between each 
observation and the political landscape changes considerably during this time, it does 
not seems reasonable to include data from the last ten elections. The standard 
deviations are instead estimated on more vague grounds and we have used our 
common sense to determine these intervals, which may affect the result a bit, we 
believe however that it does not have a significant effect on the whole.  
 
4.3.4 Simulation 2 
The purpose with the second simulation is to study the effects the variables, 
adjustment seats and the value of the first divisor in the modified Sainte-Laguë 
method, have on the Swedish election system. The constituencies are set to have the 
present distribution. This implies that they consist of different amount of mandates, 
which is the main difference to the first simulation. In addition to the general 
assumptions, we assume that total amount of people which is entitled to vote are 7 
123 651 and that the first divisor varies between 1-1.6 with a step size of 0.05. 
 
The approach is similar to the first simulation. First, 2500 election results are 
simulated, and a distribution of mandates based on this performed. The same method 
and values on the normal distribution for each party as in the first simulation, is used 
for every combination of variables. This means, that a simulation with 30 adjustment 
seats and the first divisor 1.00 is performed, as well as one with 30 adjustment seats 
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and the first divisor 1.05, and so on. The results are placed in one matrix with average 
values and one with standard deviations, with the number of adjustment seats on the 
vertical axis and the value of the first divisor in the modified Sainte-Laguë method on 
the horizontal axis. These are found in appendix C as well.  
 
4.4 Results of the Simulations 
The simulations above render out in six matrices with averaged summed values and 
six matrices with standard deviations. The full extension of these is found in the 
Appendix C.   
 
What do the numbers in the matrices say? The proportionality measure shows the 
absolute percentage deviation between numbers of votes and share of mandates. For 
example, in the 2010 election the Moderate Party received 30.50% of votes and 
30.66% of the mandates, which gives a proportionality value of 0.16. This is then 
summed for each party to a general measure of proportionality. It is worth noting that 
it is the absolute summed difference for all parties, which means that it has the same 
effect whether a party receives one to few as if they receive one to many mandates. A 
small value on the proportionality measure indicates that, a minor difference between 
the number of votes and share of mandates exist, which indicate that the result 
becomes more proportional. The standard deviation measures the average dispersion 
between each observation and the average value. A wide spread between each 
observation and the average value gives a high standard deviation. Because the 
deviation is squared, some extreme points can however have a disproportional large 
effect on the standard deviation.   
 
The proportionality measure in the 2010 election is 2.30, which is received if the 
absolute difference between share of votes and share of mandates are summed in the 
figure 4.3.1. As stated in the introduction, there was an intense debate after the last 
election. A good system shall therefore give a number that is smaller than this. This 
number is used as a benchmark to evaluate the outcomes of the simulations. 
 
In the first simulation, which is tested with different divisor systems, all of them show 
a similar pattern. They indicate that the result becomes more proportional as the 
number of adjustment seats increases. The same pattern occurs when the number of 
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constituencies decreases, however just to some extent. The result tends to improve as 
the number of constituencies decreases to fifteen, then the improvement disappears. A 
reason can be that a limit is reached, where no further improvement are possible. This 
can easily be seen in the diagrams in appendix C, which shows decreasing numbers. 
A similar development occurs with the standard deviation, which is shown in the 
matrix below. A correlation between these two measures tends to present. 
 
Exactly which divisor system gives the most proportional turnout, and which values 
shall the adjustable variables take? An exactly interpretation of the diagram shows 
that the largest number of adjustment seats, and ten or fifteen constituencies shall be 
used. The simulation is restricted to these values, there might for this reason be other 
values which give better result, for example, if 69 adjustment seats are used. The 
simulations illustrates that all the Saint-Laguë divisors results in a more proportional 
election with lower standard deviation than D´Hondt method. This becomes obvious 
just by looking at the diagrams. This confirms the literature, which states that 
D´Hondt method tends to favour larger parties, and create a less proportional system 
(Mattson and Petersson 2003, p 78). There is no system that gives better result in 
every cell than all the others, instead the values of the other variables is determining 
which divisor systems that is best suited. For example, if the current system with 29 
constituencies and 39 adjustment seats are used, the system with a first divisor 1.2 
results in the most proportional election outcome 5.75, which are far better than if the 
first divisor 1 or 1.6 is used. Still this value is worse then the benchmark value.  
 
When many constituencies are present, for this situation more than 25, the system 
with the first divisor 1.2 or 1.4 gives better result than the others. As the number of 
constituencies decreases, the difference between the systems do the same, and in 
some cases the other two divisor systems becomes more proportional. For example, if 
21 constituencies and 30 adjustment seats are used, a first divisor, 1.6, gives the best 
result. Exactly which divisor to use depends, as stated before, on which values the 
adjustable variables take. A system with 1.6 as the first divisor tends to become more 
proportional as the number of constituencies decreases at a higher pace than the other 
systems. This seems plausible, if many constituencies are present, then each 
constituency consist of less mandates. It becomes then harder for smaller parties to 
receive mandates if a large value on the first divisor is chosen. As the number of 
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constituencies decrease, more mandates are available in each constituency, which 
gives smaller parties a possibility to receive mandates. A first divisor of one, which 
tends to favour smaller parties, is always inferior to another divisor system if more 
than 15 constituencies are chosen.  
 
When 10 to 15 constituencies are used, just a small difference between the systems 
occurs. Even D´Hondt method gives a result similar to the four Sainte-Laguë 
methods, which divisor that is used does hence not have much of an impact, under 
this circumstance. If more constituencies are present, it depends on exactly which 
variables that are chosen to determine the system that is best suited. If more than 25 
constituencies are used, the most proportional result is received with the first divisor 
1.2 or 1.4. 
 
The system currently in use in Sweden gives a proportionality value of 7.60 with a 
standard deviation of 3.14 according to simulation one. This can be compared with 
the best result of 0.59 with a standard deviation of 0.13, which is obtained when 59 
adjustment seats and fifteen constituencies exists. As movement to the lower left 
corner in the diagram takes place, the result improves. The current system is placed in 
the upper right corner, which indicates that it is not optimal in order to achieve the 
most proportional result. If a change in the current system to the lower left corner in 
implemented, a much more proportional election result can be achieved. 
 
In which sense is the first simulation a reasonable way to analyse the Swedish 
election system? At the moment, 29 constituencies and 39 adjustment seats are used. 
Is it reasonable to change the number of constituencies to 15 instead of 29? As stated 
before, the constituencies are in reality not of equal size. For that reason is simulation 
two performed, where the present size of the constituencies are used. Just as in the 
first simulation gets the result more proportional as the number of adjustment seats 
increases, independently of which first divisor that is used. The standard deviation 
decreases as well when the number of adjustment sets increase. A value of the first 
divisor, which is above or beneath the interval 1.2 to 1.3 gives a less proportional 
result with a larger standard deviation than values in this interval, except for a few 
situations with many adjustment seats where the value 1.35 give a better result. This 
is though just a small difference and can be disregarded from. On the interval 1.2 to 
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1.3, the number of adjustment seats determines which system that is most 
proportional. When a value above 45 adjustment seats is chosen however, the 
difference between the systems becomes insignificant small. When the variables take 
the 2010 election values, the result 3.92 with the standard deviation 2.23 is received. 
The difference to the most proportional result, 0.68 with standard deviation 0.25, 
when 59 adjustment seats and a first divisor of 1.3 is used, is significant large. 
Simulation 2 shows that a more proportional result can be obtained if the current 
system is changed. It is worth noting that the actual result in the 2010 election was 
2.30, which are less than the comparable value received in this simulation. The 
difference is 1.62, this is however less than the standard deviation. The result in the 
simulations tends hence to give a good reflection of reality. This indicate as well that 
a worse outcome than in the last election can occur, and since a debate followed the 
last election, an even larger debate may occur if the result becomes even more 
disproportional. 
 
4.5 Analysis of the Results 
The conclusion from both simulations is that as the number of adjustment seats 
increases the result becomes more proportional. The standard deviation of the result 
decreases as well, which give a more stable result. The first simulation shows that the 
Sainte-Laguë in general gives a more proportional result with lower standard 
deviation than the D´Hondt method. The first devisor has a significant impact on the 
result. It cannot though be said that any of them is superior to all of the others, instead 
it depends on the values the adjustable variables take. If the current system with 29 
constituencies and 39 adjustment seats are used, a system with the first divisor 1.2 is 
the most proportional. If more adjustment seats are allowed, the divisor 1.4 gives a 
similar result. The proportionality value is still around 4, which is a high value and 
above the benchmark value 2.3. Simulation two, which is based on 29 constituencies, 
presents lower values than simulation one. It indicates that a value between 1.2 and 
1.3 is optimal and as the number of adjustment seats increases, the more proportional 
the result becomes, which is the same conclusion as simulation one when 29 
constituencies are used. It is worth mentioning that as the number of adjustment seats 
decreases below 41, the first divisor 1.2 is superior to the other. When the first divisor 
1.2 is used in the second simulation and the current amount of 39 adjustment seats are 
present, the proportionality measure gives the result 1.43. This is an improvement 
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compared to the benchmark value from the 2010 election 2.30. Both simulations 
indicate hence that if 29 constituencies are used, a divisor value between 1.2 and 1.3 
gives the best result, and as the number of adjustment seats increases, the more 
proportional the result becomes. 
 
An important conclusion from the first simulation is the stronger impact the number 
of constituencies has on proportionality compared to the number of adjustment seats. 
It is not possible to get a more proportional result than the last election without 
decreasing the number of constituencies. If 10 to 15 constituencies are used the result 
gets more proportional independently on the number of adjustment seats. For 
example, when the first divisor 1.2 is used with fifteen constituencies, then a 
difference of 0.29 between the best and worst outcome depending on the number of 
adjustment seats, is received. In a best-case scenario, when either 15 or 30 
constituencies are used, the difference is 3.31. Thus is can be claimed that the number 
of constituencies affects the proportionality to a larger extent than the number of 
adjustment seats. The simulation shows as well that in order to get a result that is 
more proportional than 2.30, the number of constituencies must decrease. If the 
number of constituencies decreases to a number between 10 and 15, has the value of 
the first divisor not much of an impact, neither has the number of adjustment seats. 
 
The aspect to have a more local connection for the politicians is an argument for 
keeping the number of constituencies higher. Another reason might be the economical 
and practical aspects. The classification of constituencies mostly follows the 
geographical state boundary (Mattson and Petersson 2003, p. 70) and to change this 
requires substantial administrational and economic costs. A historical and political 
aspect is a third factor. Because this classification has been used for a long time it is 
difficult to decrease the number of constituencies without protests.  
 
Why becomes the result more proportional as the number of adjustment seats 
increases? The reason for using adjustment seats is to correct for the discrepancy that 
may occur when mandates are distributed in many constituencies, instead of the 
country as one constituency. It seems quite logic that the proportionality measure 
decreases as the number of adjustment seats increases, which also is the case in both 
simulations. Does it exist any upper bound for the amount of adjustments seats that 
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can be used? The simulations give no technical argument for this. It is limited to the 
number 59 by the assumptions. The upper limit seems instead to be restricted by other 
reasons, for example, that there must be reasonable many mandates available in each 
constituency so the system makes sense. The adjustment seats shall operate as the 
name indicates, to adjust; therefore it can be argued that no more adjustment seats 
than ordinary seats shall be present.  
 
Based on our analysis it can be argued that the system used in Sweden today, not 
gives the most proportional result. Instead some of the following measures should be 
considered.  
 
• Decrease the number of constituencies to a number between 10 and 15. 
Simulation 1 shows a significant improvement in proportionality when this is 
done. A further, however minor improvement can be achieved by increasing the 
number of adjustment seats, this improvement is though substantially small when 
less number of constituencies are used. By changing the first divisor under this 
circumstances have a similar independently minor effect.  
• If a large amount of constituencies, for example the current 29, are used has the 
value of the first divisor a significant effect on proportionality. Both simulations 
indicate that a value between 1.2 and 1.3 is optimal to use under this 
circumstances. According to the second simulation, a value in this interval gives 
in general a more proportional result than the 2010 election, and as the number of 
adjustment seats increases the more proportional the result becomes. If 59 
adjustment seats are used a value of 0.72 can be achieved, which is a major 
improvement compared to the 2010 election, but even with about 40 adjustment 
seats is a more proportional result most likely to occur.  
 
Both the suggestions, which are based on the results from the simulations, indicates 
that the current system is not optimal, and by varying some of the variables a more 
proportional result can be obtained. They do however not give an exact result that 
says exactly which values to use, rather serves they as a guideline to create a more 
proportional result based on the actual circumstances. One reason is because they 
examine different aspects of the system. If it is not a realistic suggestion to decrease 
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the number of constituencies then the result based on the second simulation is to 
prefer. If there are no obstacles, it seems to be recommendable to decrease the number 
of constituencies. Which simulation gives most relevant result is neither as clear. It 
can be argued that since simulation two is based on the current distribution and that 
this simulation gives result, which is more similar to the observed values in the 2010 
election, this is the more important simulation. Simulation one should however not be 
condemned since there is no actual election to compare with when the number of 
constituencies is decreased, which is the main intention to examine in this simulation. 
Instead is the change in result when some variables are change the interesting part to 
look at, both simulation give for that reason valuable information. Even if one of them 
tends to reflect reality to larger extent, at least when it comes to numbers, shows the 
first simulation a uniform improvement in proportionality when the number of 
constituencies are decreased.  
 
Why does the second simulation in most cases give better result than the first with the 
same number on the variables? One answer is because the second simulation uses the 
current distribution of constituencies. The second simulation gives also a result, which 
is closer to the actual result of the last election than the first simulation. The aspect 
that the constituencies are of different size in the second simulation seems to play a 
significant role, especially when many constituencies are used. If they are of equal the 
smaller parties might be just beneath to receive a mandate in each constituency. When 
some constituencies instead have more mandates to distribute it makes it possible for 
smaller parties to win mandates in some constituencies at least. They will though not 
receive mandates in the minor constituencies, however they might not have done that 
anyway if all the constituencies were of equal size. 
 
The results in this essay are based on the circumstances in Sweden, the result can 
though be considered for other countries as well. D´Hondt method shows for example 
similar development as the Sainte-Laguë methods. That the result becomes more 
proportional as the number of constituencies decrease is hence an important result that 
other countries shall consider even if they use another divisor method. The same 
argument is relevant for the function that the adjustment seats has, an increase in these 
tends to establish better proportionality.  
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4.6 Shortcomings with the Simulations 
To be able to perform these simulations some assumptions had to be made. One is the 
fact that the lowest number of votes a party can receive is 4%. No party can hence fall 
below the threshold, neither can any new parties enter. This is not a total reflection of 
reality. Sometimes a new party enters and sometimes some disappears, especially 
when a party is close to the 4% threshold. If 2500 elections are held, which are based 
on the last election it is most likely that some of the parties get to few votes in some 
elections. This can affect the result and the distribution of mandates. 
 
The systems with the three blocks may not hold forever. Instead maybe all parties will 
compete individually. The left wing side is for example not a cooperation in the 2014 
election in the same sense as in the election 2010. This is though not a major problem 
since the votes are based on the result for each party separately in the last election. 
The distribution between the blocks in this essay is just for technical reasons to 
perform the simulations. The essay examines just proportionality not who actually 
wins the election. 
 
The number of mandates in the parliament is held constant in both simulations. If this 
numbers is changed, the result is of course affected. This aspect is not incorporated in 
the simulations. Exactly which impact an increase or a decrease has, is hypothetical. 
Has it the same effect as the numbers of adjustment seats? When the number of 
mandates increases gets the result more proportional as well? For that reason is a 
suggestion for future research to analyse in what way the number of mandates in the 
parliament affects the proportionality.  
 
Some upper and lower limit of adjustment sets must also be considered and the 
interval 30-59 seemed like a reasonable choice from our side. To extend these 
numbers would also require more time to perform the simulations.  
 
As stated before is neither the possibility to change the method for distributing 
mandates between the constituencies taken into account. Instead this distribution is 
taken as given. If it was possible to change this then another result would have been 
possible. 
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It would however be too extensive to take all of these aspects into consideration when 
programming the simulations. It took about one week for a computer to perform 
these. If some of the assumptions are relaxed, for example the possibility for a party 
to fall below the threshold, then it takes another week to perform the simulations. For 
that reason is it not possible to include these shortcomings in the essay. It is as stated 
before rather a suggestion for further research to investigate the effect if some of these 
restrictions are relaxed. 
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5. Summary	  
This	  chapter	  summarises	  the	  main	  aspects	  of	  this	  essay,	  namely	  the	  purpose,	  
analysis	   and	   the	   results	   as	  well	   as	   our	   suggestions	   for	  measurements	   that	  
make	  the	  Swedish	  election	  system	  more	  proportional.	  	  
	   	  
In the first chapter it is stated that the system used for the Swedish parliament election 
is not without any criticism. Rather, an ongoing debate concerning the issue of 
proportionality is present. The purpose with this essay is therefore to examine how the 
system can be made more proportional. The second aim is to present a systematic 
overview over the most common in use elections systems. Since the Swedish election 
system is the main object with the analysis, a more detailed description of this system 
is presented. An important insight from chapter three is that many different systems 
can be used and many different systems are used around the world. No system can 
however be said to be superior to all the others. Why a specific system is used is 
dependent on historical, cultural, and political reasons. 
 
Two different kind of simulations are performed to examine how proportional the 
Swedish election system is if some variables are adjusted. In the first simulation 
where the constituencies are of equal size it is clear that the outcomes becomes more 
proportional as the number of constituencies decreases. The reason for this is that 
when many constituencies are used there are fewer mandates in each constituency to 
distribute. In most cases these mandates are distributed to the largest parties, but as 
the number of constituencies decreases, more seats become available in each district 
and also the minor parties are able to win seats. Both simulations indicate that as the 
number of adjustment seats increases the more proportional the result becomes. This 
effect is however not as substantial as the effect from decreasing the number of 
constituencies, according to the first simulation. The second simulation where the 
constituencies have the current distribution of mandates shows that the value on the 
first divisor in the Sainte-Laguë divisor method has a major effect on proportionality. 
This effect is also more substantial than the effect of adjustment seats, just as in the 
first simulation. It is shown that a value between 1.2 and 1.3 gives the most 
proportional result. 
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Our result shows that the current elections system in Sweden is not optimal to achieve 
proportionality. If the adjustable variables in the simulations take the values used in 
the 2010 election, the result becomes not one of the most proportional ones. In the 
first simulation this is obvious only by looking at the diagrams, where these variables 
are in the upper right corner and the result tends to become more proportional as a 
movement to the lower let corner is performed. 
 
A comparison between the benchmark value from the 2010 election and the outcomes 
from the simulations indicate that an election turnout, which is more proportional can 
be achieved by changing some of the variables, number of constituencies, adjustment 
seats and value of the first divisor, in the elation system. According to Simulation 2 is 
a first divisor value between 1.2 and 1.3 to prefer, and as the number of adjustment 
seats increases the more proportional the result becomes. The exact value can be 
discussed, however. No strict line exist, a value above 40 is though to prefer. 
Simulation 1 suggests that the number of constituencies should decrease to a value 
between 10 and 15. If this is implemented, has the value of the first divisor not a 
significant impact, neither has the number of adjustment seats. The simulations do not 
hence give one perfect solution, since different aspects of the election system are 
examined, instead they serve as guidelines to consider when the election system is 
analysed and perhaps a reconstruction is considered. These guidelines can be 
considered for other countries with a proportional election system as well, because the 
simulations show a uniform improvement in proportionality when the number of 
constituencies decreases and the number of adjustment seats increases. 
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7. Appendix	  
 
7.1 Appendix A 
1. Stockholms kommun, 
2. Stockholms läns valkrets (Stockholms län med undantag av Stockholms kommun), 
3. Uppsala län, 
4. Södermanlands län, 
5. Östergötlands län, 
6. Jönköpings län, 
7. Kronobergs län, 
8. Kalmar län, 
9. Gotlands län, 
10. Blekinge län, 
11. Malmö kommun, 
12. Skåne läns västra valkrets (Bjuvs, Eslövs, Helsingborgs, Höganäs, Hörby, Höörs, Landskrona 
och Svalövs kommuner),  
13. Skåne läns södra valkrets (Burlövs, Kävlinge, Lomma, Lunds, Sjöbo, Skurups, Staffanstorps, 
Svedala, Trelleborgs, Vellinge och Ystads kommuner),  
14. Skåne läns norra och östra valkrets (Bromölla, Båstads, Hässleholms, Klippans, Kristianstads, 
Osby, Perstorps, Simrishamns, Tomelilla, Åstorps, Ängelholms, Örkelljunga och Östra 
Göinge kommuner), 
15. Hallands län, 
16. Göteborgs kommun, 
17. Västra Götalands läns västra valkrets (Härryda, Kungälvs, Lysekils, Munkedals, Mölndals, 
Orusts, Partille, Sotenäs, Stenungsunds, Strömstads, Tanums, Tjörns, Uddevalla och Öckerö 
kommuner),  
18. Västra Götalands läns norra valkrets (Ale, Alingsås, Bengtsfors, Dals- Eds, Färgelanda, 
Herrljunga, Lerums, Lilla Edets, Melleruds, Trollhättans, Vårgårda, Vänersborgs och Åmåls 
kommuner),  
19. Västra Götalands läns södra valkrets (Bollebygds, Borås, Marks, Svenljunga, Tranemo och 
Ulricehamns kommuner),  
20. Västra Götalands läns östra valkrets (Essunga, Falköpings, Grästorps, Gullspångs, Götene, 
Hjo, Karlsborgs, Lidköpings, Mariestads, Skara, Skövde, Tibro, Tidaholms, Töreboda och 
Vara kommuner),  
21. Värmlands län, 
22. Örebro län,  
23. Västmanlands län,  
24. Dalarnas län,  
25. Gävleborgs län,  
26. Västernorrlands län,  
27. Jämtlands län,  
28. Västerbottens län, och  
29. Norrbottens län. 
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Appendix B 
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Appendix C 
Simulation one 
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